INTRODUCTION
One of the most vexing problems facing managers of fishery stocks is the problem of incidental harvesting of non-targeted species. Bycatch, as the incidental catch is called, occurs with almost every fishery to some degree since the harvester does not observe exactly what he is catching until his gear is drawn to the surface. 1 However, the term ''bycatch'' is generally used to describe incidental catch in a fishery for which there exists another constituency with a claim on the bycatch species. Though sonar fish finders, improved technologies in trawl net design, increased use of pots, and other gear substitution may reduce bycatch, as long as the target and the non-target species intermingle it is often impossible to eliminate 2 Ž it entirely. Public pressure e.g., concerning dolphin bycatch in the tuna fishery in the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico or green sea turtle bycatch in the Gulf of . Mexico shrimp fishery , legal requirements such as the Endangered Species Act Ž . e.g., concerning Columbia River chinook salmon , and political pressure from Ž competing interest groups e.g., concerning incidental take of halibut, crab, and salmon in the North Pacific groundfish fisheries and incidental take of chum * This paper has benefited from comments made by Diane Bischak, two anonymous referees, and an associate editor. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Mortality rates in ocean fisheries bycatch are high because the fish being taken are pulled to the Ž w x. surface too quickly or in too great a mass to survive the pressure e.g., 18 . 2 The cod and pollock trawl fisheries in the North Pacific are moving toward nets which have square shaped spaces rather than diamond shaped spaces. The diamond shaped spaces become elongated Ž . under pressure, reducing the chance that smaller and flatter fish e.g., halibut can escape. The square spaces technology is an attempt to reduce this type of bycatch. However, even this method cannot Ž w x . exclude bycatch of different but similar sized species. See 23, April 1993, p. 61 . An exception is the Ž . turtle excluder devices TEDs which have virtually eliminated turtle bycatch in the Southeast shrimp w x fishery 25 .
. salmon in the Aleutian Islands sockeye salmon intercept fishery all force managers to impose limits on bycatch of certain species.
Thus bycatch presents several unique problems to managers. First, the manager Ž . is faced with the efficiency and political problem of determining the allocation of the bycatch between competing interests. Second, once the manager has deter-Ž mined an allocation, the allocation may not be internally consistent i.e., may not . maximize profits for individuals participating in the fishery while at the same time satisfying resource conservation constraints. For example, if the total allowable Ž . catch TAC for the bycatch species is reached before the TAC for the target fishery species, the TAC in the target fishery may not be harvested, escapement may be higher than desired, and fish may be ''left on the table,'' in the jargon of fishermen. 3 Thus the bycatch problem presents a challenge to managers' attempts to control harvest and escapement simultaneously in the target and bycatch fisheries. Third, bycatch will likely change as factors such as technology and prices change. Thus a program which is successful in one state of the world may fail in another. This point is particularly apt for fisheries managers since most of the current direction in regulation of bycatch is toward gear restrictions or time and area closures. While these methods may reduce bycatch, it is the exceptional case in which these restrictions eliminate bycatch or give fisherman an incentive to internalize the full costs of bycatch. 4 Furthermore, while such restrictions may be effective at reducing bycatch, their economic viability is often questionable. 5 This paper presents a stylized model of bycatch in a fishery. The problem is examined from the perspective of a single season. Although there are exceptions Ž . such as predator᎐prey relations between species , TAC limits on levels of harvest for both the target and bycatch species can be treated as predetermined within a 3 For example, in the North Pacific groundfish fishery, halibut bycatch TAC limits forced early closure of the 1992 longline cod fleet, with approximately 27,000 metric tons of the cod TAC not taken w x 23, Aug. 1992 . In 1990, the domestic flatfish fisheries in Zone 1 of the Bering Sea were closed on February 27, 1990 because of C. bairdi crab bycatch, though it later resumed in March. On March 14, 1990 , the domestic flatfish fishery was again closed due to halibut bycatch, and on March 19, 1990 , the entire Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands fishery was closed to domestic flatfish fisheries because of w x Ž halibut bycatch 23, May 1990 . After noting that more than 47,000 metric tons of sole $22.8 million, . gross value were unharvested by the domestic fleet and that about half the 127,000 metric tons of sole would be unharvested by the joint-venture fleet, both because the 1990 halibut bycatch TAC constraint was reached in the Bering Sea, National Marine Fishery Service Biologist Janet Smoker observed ''It Ž w x . looks like a lot of money will be left in the ocean this year'' quoted in 23, June 1990, p. 63 .
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Ž . The turtle excluder devices TEDs have been reported to be quite successful in the shrimp fisheries. However, green sea turtles are only one source of bycatch. The shrimp fisheries are reported w x w to catch more finfish biomass than shrimp 23, May 1992, p. 25 and more uneconomic mollusks 17, pp.
x 18᎐19 . Similarly, in the North Pacific, time and area closures have protected halibut spawning grounds from the groundfish fleets. However, halibut bycatch is almost impossible to eliminate fully given that Ž w x. halibut and cod coexist in similar ecological niches e.g., 5 . In the ''Area M'' salmon fishery in the Bering Sea, which targets sockeye salmon destined for Bristol Bay, there is bycatch of chum salmon w x destined for Norton Sound 9 . As the two species are similar in size and in migration patterns, simple time and area closures will not eliminate bycatch without shutting down the target fishery. 5 A disadvantage of technologies created by the regulatory process is that it is not clear such technologies are economically sound. This is not true for technologies adopted under an ITQ or tax w x system. If fishermen adopt new technologies, the technology is economically viable. Ward 25 has developed a model to show the effect on stocks and allocations if a new technology is adopted, but there are no costs of adopting the technology. Thus, while his model tells us something about what might happen if new technology is adopted, he tells us nothing about the viability of the technology. In addition, fishermen have complained that the process of testing new gear types is too slow under the w x command and control management in the North Pacific groundfish fishery 23, Apr. 1993, p. 61. . season due to resource conservation constraints. 6 In addition, it is assumed that the bycatch is produced incidentally by the target fishery, as pollution is produced incidentally in the production of steel or sawdust is produced incidentally in the production of lumber. The model is also determinant as there is assumed to be no uncertainty regarding harvest rates or prices. Finally, since the viability of gear restrictions is mainly an empirical question, the focus is on what effect taxes or Ž . individual transferable quotas ITQs have on bycatch. Looking at the problem from the context of a single season and treating the fisheries as distinct allocations, accurately represents the manner in which many fisheries are managed. Legal requirements force managers to set season limits on the catch of the target species to maintain sustainability of the stocks. Thus, even if the species are treated as part of a multi-species fishery, harvest TACs may exist for individual species. In addition, fisheries are often managed on a multi-species basis, so limits on bycatch are set in the general context of allocation of the resource among competing uses.
Ž . This paper focuses on three questions: 1 How should the bycatch species be Ž . allocated among its competing uses? 2 How does open access affect bycatch Ž . rates? 3 Can rationalization through individual transferable quotas or taxes achieve the social optimal allocation of bycatch and effort?
Of the assumptions made in this paper, the assumption regarding the bycatch technology is the most restrictive. Bycatch is treated as a function solely of the harvest rate of the target species. This is a very restrictive form of a multi-product production function. In part, it may be defended by an appeal to the fact that in many fisheries, the bycatch is actually quite small relative to the harvest level. For example, bycatch of salmon in the North Pacific groundfish fisheries is roughly one salmon per fifty tons of groundfish. This becomes economically significant only when the amount of groundfish is quite large. Bycatch of Washington and Oregon salmon by Alaska trollers targeting salmon from Alaskan rivers is even less. Clearly, however, objections can be raised to this defense. Shrimp fisheries, for example, regularly have bycatch of ''trash fish'', mollusks and other bottom dwellers, that is in excess of the quantity of shrimp recovered on a pound to pound basis. Other fisheries are truly multi-species fisheries. For example, the ''Area M'' fishery which intercepts sockeye salmon en route to Bristol Bay in Alaska also catches large proportions of chum salmon bound for the Yukon River and Norton w x Ž Sound 9 . In cases such as this, depicting the fishery as a target fishery sockeye . Ž . salmon with bycatch chum salmon is clearly a stretch. However, in such cases the present model may serve as a useful simplification of a difficult problem.
MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Assume that there exist two biological species, the target and bycatch species. 7 The target stock is harvested by fisherman in Fishery One. The bycatch species 6 For examples of papers where the interdependent biological relationships are considered in the w x w x context of bioeconomic models see 11 and 26 . 7 The simplification of treating the target species as a single species and the bycatch as a single species is justified on the grounds that in the North Pacific cod, pollock, and sablefish are managed as w x Ž single species in the Gulf of Alaska 20 . However, in the Bering Sea, the groundfish resource yellowfin . sole, pollock, Pacific ocean perch, turbot, Atka mackerel, Pacific cod, and sablefish is managed as a Ž . w x complex i.e., as a multi-species fishery 21 . This paper focuses on the simpler case where the target species and bycatch can be considered as separate single species. Ž may be the target stock in Fishery Two e.g., in the North Pacific, crab is bycatch to . the groundfish fishery , or it may be a species not targeted by any commercial Ž . fishery e.g., dolphins to the tuna fishery . The bycatch species may have existence Ž w x. 
A. Technology Assumptions
Assume that fisherman within each fishery are homogeneous in terms of opportunity costs, fishing skills, and technology, although there may be differences between the technologies used in the two fisheries. In addition, assume that there are no stock or congestion externalities in either fishery. These assumptions imply w x that stock and aggregate effort levels do not enter into the profit function 6 . Let variable profits for harvest of the target species for vessel j in Fishery One be Ž . defined as h ; P , where h is the harvest per day of the target species by 1 1j 1 1 j Ž vessel j, and P is the output price of the target species. Since the output level homogeneous, the j subscript on the harvest level is omitted except where doing so will cause confusion, i.e., h s h , j s 1, . . . , N , where N is the maximum Ž . ties dropping the P arguments :
The first two parts of A.1 imply that zero harvest yields zero profits and that profits increase as the harvest rate increases. The third part of A.1 states that profits are concave in h . species. Fishery Two is assumed to have no bycatch of the targets species for Fishery One. 9 As the rate of harvest of the target species is the only variable 8 The existence value aspect of some bycatch was suggested by an anonymous referee. 9 Bycatch is usually asymmetric in this sense. A very clear set of examples has to do with the salmon fisheries in the North Pacific. The bycatch of Columbia River sockeye salmon by the Southeast Alaska troll fishery is not symmetric; there is no corresponding Southeast Alaska salmon bycatch in the Columbia River area. Similarly, in the Area ''M'' intercept sockeye salmon fishery, bycatch of Norton Sound and Yukon River chum salmon occurs, but no bycatch of sockeye salmon occurs in the Norton Sound or Yukon River chum salmon fisheries. While bycatch of cod and pollock may also occur in the halibut and crab fisheries, such bycatch is trivial.
available a fisherman controls, input substitution is ignored in the analysis. The Fishery One bycatch function is assumed to have the following properties:
The first three parts of A.2 says that zero bycatch is possible only with zero output of the target species, and that bycatch is positive and increases as output of w x the target species increases. Thus bycatch is ''essential'' to the target fishery 13 . Regarding the fourth assumption, when b Y s 0, there is a fixed-proportion rela-Ž Ž . tionship between bycatch and harvest of the target species i.e., b h ' ␣h , for 1 1 .
Y some non-negative constant ␣ , and when b ) 0, the ratio of bycatch to the target species increases as the harvest rate increases. 10 This functional relationship assumes that methods to reduce bycatch require greater care be taken in harvesting the target species, slowing down that harvest rate, but that it is impossible to fully eliminate bycatch with the given technology. The costs of separating, counting, and either selling or disposing of the bycatch are assumed to depend on the harvest level, so these costs are already accounted for in the function. Thus part of the
reason for the decline in marginal profits -0 is due to the increase in the i bycatch proportion as harvest of the target species increases. Bycatch is being Ž w x. modeled as though it were ''pollution'' being generated with output e.g., 7 , with Ž . part of the cost being internalized sorting, counting, etc. and part being external Ž . the reduction in available stock to others . However, the pollution analogy is incomplete since part of the external cost is borne by others within the industry in the bycatch case due to the TAC constraint. Pollution controls generally are stated in terms of pollution allowed per firm.
To consider several cases within the context of a single model a pair of Ž . Ä 4 parameters ␦, ␥ will be used to differentiate between the cases. Let ␦ g y1, 0, 1 Ž be the weight associated with bycatch in the objective function of a vessel or . Ž society in Fishery One. When ␦ s 1, the vessel is allowed to sell the bycatch at . price P in addition to the selling target species harvest at price P . When ␦ s 0, 2 1 the vessel derives no direct value from the bycatch. When ␦ s y1, each unit of bycatch costs society P , say from foregone existence value. The parameter 2 Ä 4 Ž ␥g 0, 1 is used to switch between having an active commercial fishery Fishery . Two targeting the bycatch species and not having one. When ␥ s 0, the bycatch species has no commercial value, although it may have existence value if ␥ s 0 and ␦ s y1.
Ž . Given a season length of T e.g., the number of days the fishery is open , a 1 Ž . market price of P for the target species dollars per fish , P for the bycatch 1 2 Ž . Ž species dollars per fish , and an identical fixed but avoidable cost k dollars per 
Ž . Ž . However, if b Y ) 0, the bycatch to target species harvest ratio may be reduced by slowing down the w x harvest rate on each vessel. Berger, et al. 6 have found that there is considerable variability in bycatch to harvest ratios in the Bering Sea groundfish trawl fisheries. The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council considered plans to kick individual fishermen out of the fishery if their bycatch rate was too high. This suggests that fishermen can control bycatch to some extent with the given technology. 11 Note that when ␦ s y1, the term in square brackets is identical in form to a pollution model with Ž . the firm paying P per unit pollution, b h , emitted. 2 1 When b
sufficiently concave such that second-order conditions hold. If Fishery Two exists, then given a season length of T , bycatch market price of 2 Ž . P , and a fixed but avoidable cost k also identical across fishermen , season 2 2 profits to vessel j in Fishery Two arë
Suppose that n F N vessels participate in the fishery targeting the target 1 1 species. The TAC constraint for the target species is
where the equality holds due to fishermen being homogeneous. Similarly, for the bycatch species, the bycatch TAC constraint is
where the equality holds due to fishermen being homogeneous. 12 The constraint in Ž . 4 could be rewritten as two constraints, one for each fishery, if the allocation were to be divided up between Fishery One and Fishery Two as,
and Ž . The advantage of writing the constraint as 5 is that it shows that a positive bycatch allocation is necessary for Fishery One to exist given assumption A.2. In the event that ␥ s 0, and ␦ s 1, B F S denotes the share of the possible total 2 Ž .
Ž . Ž . S allowable bycatch that the fishery is allocated. Note that both 3 and 4 are 2 
Ž
. quasi-convex in T , n , h , B . This is used below to establish sufficiency for the
Kuhn᎐Tucker conditions. In addition, assume that there exists an upper bound on the length of the season for each fishery. For example, these constraints could be due to the seasonal nature of spawning of the target and bycatch species. Given the fixed-but-avoidable costs of entering, such a constraint is necessary to solve the social planner's Ž w x . Ž .
12 It is assumed that bycatch cannot be simply discarded without being counted toward one's quota.
In the North Pacific groundfish fishery, this is enforced by an ''observer program'' where trained observers monitor what is being caught on each vessel. In the case where bycatch can be sold, this Ž w x w x. problem would not occur except for high-grading e.g., 1 , 2 . 13 The assumption of a fixed-but-avoidable cost is necessary to obtain a determinacy for n and T Ž . where the i subscripts have been dropped . In the simple model with no bycatch, if k s 0 the first-order conditions to the social planner's problem reduce to the two equations in three unknowns:
X s rh and S s Tnh. While h is determined exactly, T and n are not. The constraint on T is also necessary. If k ) 0 and there is no constraint on T, then the solution to the social planner's problem involves the non-solvable equations T s k, and n s 0. Both assumptions are plausible for the real world. Most fisheries require some reworking of gear or travel to the fishery to participate, thus k ) 0. Also, in many fisheries, the species is economically viable to harvest only at certain times of the year due to biological or market conditions, so the assumption of a maximum season length is also plausible. Finally, there are also non-negativity constraints for the h , and n , and the T . 
B. Which Constraint Will Bind?
The ratio of bycatch to harvest of the target species Fishery One is defined to be Ž .
Ž . b h rh . Thus if n vessels fish T time periods, they will take T n b h of the Ž . Ž .
If the bycatch ratio brh is greater than Fishery One's bycatch species TAC to target species TAC ratio BrS , then the bycatch constraint will be binding; Thus, for h ) h , the bycatch species TAC constraint binds, and for h -h , the 
THE SOCIAL PLANNER'S PROBLEM

A. Optimization Problem for Social Planner
Given fixed output prices, the value society obtains from the two fisheries is given by
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . which is simply the sum of economic profits in the two fisheries. Equation 8 can Ž . be shown to be quasi-concave in T , n , h , B . This plus the quasi-convexity of the
Ž . Ž . constraints 3 ᎐ 6 ensure sufficiency for the Kuhn᎐Tucker conditions the Arrow᎐Enthoven sufficiency theorem, assuming the constraint qualification is met. The Lagrangian for this problem is w x w x
LsVqSyT n h q B y T n b h q S y B y T n h Ž .
where the Lagrange multipliers , , , , , , , and , i s 1, 2, correspond
Ž . Ž . Ž . to the constraints 3 , 5 , 6 , and the non-negativity constraints, respectively.
In fisheries such as the North Pacific groundfish fishery, bycatch of crab, halibut, and salmon are of commercial value, but they are not allowed to be sold by the Ž . groundfish fishery. The bycatch is disposed of by dumping it back into the sea. By the envelope theorem, it may be seen that this restriction is not based on efficiency. Thus the prohibition in many fisheries on Fishery One selling bycatch is based on something other than efficiency. More likely, it is based on a desire by Fishery Two to reduce the incentive for Fishery One to benefit from the bycatch. Allowing Fishery One to sell the bycatch gives them an incentive to incur higher bycatch rates. Thus it increases the competition for the bycatch species, reducing the Ž w x. number of vessels in Fishery Two cf. 18 .
Assuming the social planner chooses the bycatch allocation B, effort in each fishery h , i s 1, 2, the number of entrants in each fishery n , i s 1, 2, and the 
Ž .
Ѩ L r Ѩ ns T q ␦ Py b y h y kq s 0, Ž .
Ž . 
Ѩ L r Ѩ Ts n q ␦ Py b y h y q s 0, Ž .
Ž . Ž . Equation 9 shows that if the bycatch is allocated to each fishery, then s ; 1 2 i.e., the marginal value of the bycatch is equal across the fisheries. Otherwise, bycatch will be allocated entirely to the fishery with the largest . If the harvest but not all of the target species TAC, utilizing the entire season a¨ailable to it, and Ž Fishery Two does not fish i.e., T s n s h s 0, T s T , n ) 0, h ) 0, and Proposition 2 shows that if both stocks have commercial value, it is optimal to Ž . either utilize both stocks case iii , with bycatch being utilized fully, or to fish only in the Fishery which has the highest marginal value for an additional unit of Ž . Ž bycatch cases i and ii . If the bycatch TAC were also a choice variable say in a Ž . . multi-season model with maximization of 8 within each season , then it is clear Ž that the bycatch species will always be fully utilized either as a target species, as . bycatch, or as both . Thus the long run trade-off is between increasing the bycatch TAC now and in the future. There would be tremendous short-term pressure to increase the TAC of the bycatch now, especially if one of the fisheries is shut down as a result of the low bycatch species TAC.
A corollary to Proposition 2 has to do with the case where the manager has no control over the bycatch allocation to Fishery One. In this case, B may be chosen Ž . by another agency e.g., halibut and groundfish in the North Pacific or as a legal limit imposed on the take of species for which there is no commercial value, but for Ž . which society has existence value e.g., dolphins in the tuna fishery . 
Ž .
and plugging into 12 , the optimal harvest rate must satisfy
Ž . Ž . Ž . . shown in Fig. 2 . If each bycatch removal results in lost existence value ␦ s y1 the optimal harvest rate decreases relative to the case where ␦ s 0. These results, however, are contingent upon the convexity of the bycatch function. If b Y s 0, then ⌫ s 9, and the optimal harvest level is unaffected by ␦. 18 It can also be shown that Ž . 10 and A.3 are sufficient to ensure that second-order conditions are satisfied for U U Ž . selection of h , given T s T and 3 determines n . Which shows that the optimal harvest rate is independent of both P and P . That is, the optimal Ž .
UU
Using 10 to eliminate in 12 , the optimal harvest level h thus solves and ⌫ s 0, so the second term drops out in both expressions, and the optimal harvest level is the same whichever constraint is binding. When b Y ) 0, ␤ ) 1. Thus 0 -1 y 1r␤ -1. Since X h ) 0, the optimal harvest level h UU is greater 1 1 1 than h U , the optimal harvest level when the target species TAC is binding or 1 b Y s 0. However, note that Ѩ h UU rѨ␦ s 0, unlike the case where the target species 1 TAC binds. If the bycatch constraint binds, being able to sell the bycatch has no effect on the harvest level. A comparison of the equilibrium harvest levels is shown in Fig. 3 
Ž .
Ž . Ž . and 17 . In both 16 and 17 , the right-hand side is an increasing function of the harvest rate. Thus, either an increase in entry costs, k or a decrease in the length 1 of the season, T results in an increased harvest rate per vessel. Thus with higher 1 entry costs, the social planner uses each vessel more intensely so that the number Ž . of vessels may be reduced. Note that an increase in B or S whichever is binding 1 does not affect the optimal harvest per vessel, but does increase the number of vessels used.
C. Both Stocks Exploited Commercially
If both fisheries are exploited commercially, then ␥ ) 0. Since the bycatch species has commercial value, assume that ␦ / y1. First, consider the case where both stocks are fully exploited, so that 0 -B -S . Ž . Ž . T s T . In addition, the first-order conditions 9 and 11 imply, 2 2 s s
which says that the marginal value of another unit of the bycatch stock is equal to its value in production in the Fishery Two, which targets that stock. Similarly, from Ž . 10 :
This says that the value of an additional unit of the target species stock equals the value of a marginal unit of production from that stock minus the marginal value of Ž . Ž . an additional unit of bycatch. Using 18 and 19 , the optimal levels of harvest per vessel are given by Ž .
U Figure 4 shows that analysis. From Eq. 16 , the solution is h in Fig. 4 . Let us now compare the optimal harvest rate in Fishery One for the case where Ž Y . bycatch affects the optimal harvest rate in Fishery One i.e., b ) 0 . As in Fig. 2 , Ž X . the net marginal profits when ␦ s 0 ⌽ y ⌫ lies above the net marginal profits 1 2 w Ž X . x curve ⌽ q P y ⌫ when ␦ s 1 since ⌫ -0. Thus, the harvest rate in 1 2 2 Fishery One increases as ␦ increases. When the target fishery is allowed to sell the bycatch the cost of the bycatch constraint declines, and vessels increase the harvest rate, incurring a higher bycatch rate. The optimal number of vessels are given by the TAC constraints for the target and bycatch species, respectively, i.e.,
OPEN ACCESS EQUILIBRIA
Under open access each entrant chooses a harvest rate to maximize profits, but entry drives economic profits to zero. Thus h q ␦ P b h s k rT , and h s k rT , ᭙ j. 2 6 Ž .
Ž . Ž . Ž .
The season profits for vessel j in Fishery One depends upon which TAC Ž . Ž . constraint s is are binding. If the target species TAC is binding in Fishery One, the season length is T s S rÝ n 1 h . If the bycatch constraint is binding and of capture'' basis between the target and bycatch fisheries, then T s
A. Only Fishery One Commercially Exploited
TAC for target species binding.
If the target species harvest constraint is Ž . binding, then using the season profits 2 with the season length substituted out Ž . using 4 as above, the level of harvest which maximizes profits can be shown to satisfy
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . eliminate n in 27 , gives an expression involving only h :
Ž .
Ž . Rewriting 27 in this fashion is convenient in that the comparative statics can be Ž .
T derived simply by totally differentiating 28 . In particular, note that Ѩ h rѨ␦ s Ž . expected effect that the harvest rate and hence, the bycatch rate is increased. Of course, this also implies that a tax on bycatch equal to P would reduce the harvest profits is Ž . species TAC. In the social optimum condition 17 , the same effect was noted.
Ž . However, the solution in 17 did not depend upon ␦ P . This is not the case in the given implicitly by: 
B. Two Fisheries, One TAC Constraint on the Bycatch Species
Now suppose that the bycatch species can be used either as bycatch or as a target species, and the allocation is decided by the ''rule of capture.'' Each fishery Ž . shuts down once the bycatch TAC is taken. Thus, T s T F min T , T , which is given by: Proposition 4 suggests that an open access fishery which allocates bycatch by the rule of capture will be unstable. Thus, once a bycatch species becomes commercially viable, even if each fishery remains open access, the bycatch species is Ž . explicitly allocated between the bycatch user group Fishery One and the target Ž . user group Fishery Two . To do otherwise would induce multiple equilibria, meaning that the manager would be unable to predict the economic consequences of their actions.
C. Two Fisheries, Separate TAC Constraints on the Bycatch Species
However, as we shall see in this section, the allocation may be contentious. X . at the¨essel le¨el.
2 Corollary 4.1 shows that even if the manager is able to set a bycatch allocation such that a unit of the bycatch has equal value to each fishery, one of the fisheries will close before the other, creating an incentive for fishermen in the fishery with the shorter season to request a larger allocation. If the manager sets the allocation such that T s T , then fishermen in one fishery or the other will have a higher 1 2 value at the margin for the bycatch, creating an incentive for fishermen in the fishery with the higher marginal valuation of the bycatch to request a larger allocation. In either case, the fishery manager will face pressures to reallocate the bycatch, and ultimately, to raise TAC limits.
D. Effect of Prohibiting Sales of Bycatch by Fishery One
In the North Pacific groundfish fisheries, bycatch of halibut, salmon, and crab cannot be sold, although this is not true for all fisheries. 20 In Fig. 6 This helps to explain the prohibition on selling bycatch by Fishery One, even Ž . though it is socially inefficient see Proposition 1 . If Fishery One can sell its bycatch, it decreases their incentive to reduce bycatch. This causes a larger 20 An anonymous referee reports that in the Mid-Atlantic scallop fishery, there is substantial bycatch of summer flounder, black sea bass, lobster, and monkfish, and that these species are all sold. bycatch, which decreases the take available to the second fleet. Prohibiting the first fleet from selling its bycatch therefore increases the number of vessels who can Ž w x. 21 participate in the second fishery cf. 12, 14 .
The prohibition on Fishery One from selling bycatch supports the position that Ž bycatch is morally wrong. This allows Fishery Two or whoever gets value from the . bycatch to maintain the higher moral ground in the bycatch debate, which is very w x useful in the political arena. A similar result has been observed by Hahn 10, p. 30 with respect to the position taken by environmentalists against marketable pollution permits. In each case, a prohibition on selling the bycatch or pollution reduces the legitimacy of the claim by the bycatch fleet or the polluter, and in both cases, a prohibition on trades reduces social welfare. Thus in each case, the prohibition has to do with one group wishing to prevent transfers to the other group.
RATIONALIZING BYCATCH WITH TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS
Suppose that managers rationalize the fishery using an individual transferable quota system. 22 Assume that there are two quota systems, one for the target species, and one for the bycatch species. Indeed, two quota systems are necessary for the system to fully rationalize the bycatch problem for all possible outcomes. Since there are no congestion or stock externalities, an ITQ system will be capable w x of generating the social optimum 6 . This result is extended here to the case of bycatch, but only if there exists a competitive quota market for whichever species is the binding constraint, and only if taking the bycatch imposes no lost existence value.
A. Both Species Commercially Har¨ested
Ž
. Let m and m be the market clearing competitive season rental prices for 1 2 quotas of the target and bycatch species, respectively. Assume each vessel j in Fishery One which participated in the open access fishery is given an identical quota for the target and bycatch species, q 1 and q 2 , and that each vessel in
Fishery Two which participated in the open access fishery is given a quota of the bycatch species q 2 . Assume also that the TAC for each fishery is completely 2 j 1 2 Ž k . allocated as quota shares. Let z and z denote purchases z ) 0 or sales Ž . season lengths are constrained by the upper bounds, T and T as in 6 . In 1 2 addition, for an individual vessel the harvest of the target and bycatch species is limited by his initial quota allocation net of purchases or sales
Ž . 1j 1j 1j 1j 1 21 It can also be shown that if the bycatch TAC binds for Fishery One, the prohibition on selling bycatch increases the total harvest of the target species.
22 w x See 1, 2, 6, 14 for discussions of ITQ systems.
Ž . The problem is that even if m ) 0 in this case, m only reflects the scarcity of 2 2 the bycatch TAC to Fishery One. It does not reflect the full social cost of taking additional units of bycatch.
C. Using Taxes Instead of ITQs
There is nothing unique about the ITQ system from a pure efficiency viewpoint. Ž Indeed, the prices m and m along with a tax of P if the bycatch has existence 1 2 2 . value could be used as taxes instead, and the same allocation would be achieved. However, a tax system would be much less politically viable since the tax would charge vessels for use of every unit of harvest and bycatch, while a tradable quota system would only charge them explicitly once they have used up their initial quota Ž w x. e.g., 7 .
ITQs will not produce an efficient allocation if production externalities are w x present 6 . A tax system might be thought to be less sensitive to this criticism. However, for either a tax or an ITQ system to remedy the production externalities, there must be additional markets or taxes. For example, if there are congestion externalities present, then either an entry fee or a tradable limited entry permit would be necessary in addition to the taxes or tradable quotas on harvesting. 
D. Will Vessels Fish ''Cleaner''?
When the bycatch problem in the North Pacific groundfish fishery began to become quite serious in the late 1980s, managers were surprised at the large w x quantities of target species TAC left unharvested. '' We assumed the fleet would modify its behavior when faced with bycatch caps and closures,'' said one management official. 24 One question that remains with rationalization is will it have discernible effects in regard to lowering the ratio of bycatch to the target species? That is, will vessels fish ''cleaner''? Figure 7 shows the relationship between the harvest rate under open access and Ž . under the social optimum. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined a stylized economic model of the fisheries bycatch problem.
Ž w x. It was assumed that there are no production externalities e.g., 6 ; vessels within each fishery are homogeneous; prices are not affected by changes in harvest rates w x or total harvest levels; the target fishery is treated as a single species fishery 24 ; w x there are no multiple grades or high grading problems 1, 3 ; and the bycatch rate depends only on the harvest rate of the target species. All of these assumptions are over-simplifications of the environments in which managers face the bycatch problem.
Even within this simplified framework, it has been shown that open access solutions under the ''rule of capture'' allocation may be unstable. When bycatch is explicitly allocated between different uses, the harvest rate under open access may be optimal, but the number of entrants will be too large. These results should give policy makers an added incentive to work toward some form of rationalization. Unfortunately, this paper has given reason to be cautious about how the bycatch problem is integrated into the general problem of rationalizing fisheries. Here, the correct incentives can be given to vessels only by creating transferable quota systems for both the target and bycatch species which are tradable between fisheries. Even this will not be sufficient if there are externalities beyond the simple common properties externality due to lack of ownership. In particular, if the bycatch species has existence value an ITQ system will not be sufficient to eliminate the external cost of bycatch removals. Similar conclusions would be reached if there also existed production externalities.
The model in this paper has focused entirely on the in-season problem. Most of the fisheries economics literature has been concerned with optimization over an infinite planning horizon. To fully appreciate the subtleties of the problem, the model proposed here would have to be placed inside of a model such as proposed w x by McKelvey 16 . In this context, the present model shows that for a given technology, there may be many instances where the joint TAC constraints for the bycatch and target species are incompatible in the sense that both will not be fully harvested. This result can occur under a rationalized system as well as under an open access system. It is not surprising that in the face of such short-term pressures, managers have sought to solve the problem with a command and control focus on technology. However, it is not clear that the gear restrictions are necessarily good economic policy. Even if such restrictions were good economic policy, a command and control system is probably the least likely means of finding such a technology. Furthermore, as is shown in Figs. 3 and 5 , the open access Ž harvest rate per vessel may well equal the social optimal harvest rate for a given . technology for a range of bycatch ratios. Just because the observed bycatch ratio equals the allowable bycatch ratio does not mean that rents are being maximized.
